entering the pipeline increased consistently from 2005 to 2008, reaching an average of 116 per month during the first 10 months of 2008 and subsequently falling by 10% through to February 2010 [3] .
A number of scholars have analyzed the mechanism from multiple angles, informing about its positive outcomes, shortcomings and avenues for future improvement. This article reviews this literature and contributes to it by examining the case of Mexico, the fourth largest CDM-host country in the world and the second in Latin America after Brazil. We identify and discuss a set of institutional processes and factors that have shaped the configuration of Mexico's CDM portfolio, which is dominated by methane avoidance and landfill gas activities, and less so by wind farm projects. We also pick up three representative projects from these sectors and analyze their performance through the lens of SD. The findings contribute to emerging research on the governance and outcomes of the CDM and inform international and Mexican policymakers, as well as project developers, about enabling conditions for project development and shortcomings in existing projects.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section reviews the literature concerned with CDM governance and outcomes. The third section highlights the methods and the three selected case studies. The fourth section presents and discusses the results differentiating between governance aspects and project design and implementation outcomes. The last two sections summarize and conclude the paper providing a reflection on the CDM's future regarding its dual aim of contributing to climate mitigation and SD.
CDM governance & performance issues
The CDM is a key pillar of the global carbon market that also includes the EU-ETS, other regional, national and sub-national allowance-based trading systems (e.g., New Zealand's emissions trading scheme), Joint Implementation and the voluntary carbon market [4] . The CDM is an important element of international climate and clean development governance through which state and non-state actors interact by developing activities while continuously shaping its norms, procedures and practices [5, 6] . In the context of this paper, governance is understood as the constellation of private and public actors, including governments, and decision-making processes, including policymaking, that interact to produce outcomes related to the performance of the CDM in a particular national and local context. We acknowledge that CDM governance is intimately related to broader 'clean development' governance that ultimately affects our ability to secure low-carbon human development in the short, medium
Key terms

Clean Development Mechanism:
Allows emission-reduction projects in developing countries to earn Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), each equivalent to one tonne of CO 2 . CERs can be traded and sold, and used by industrialized countries to a meet a part of their emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. As of June 2011, there were over 3000 Clean Development Mechanism-registered projects that could potentially result in over 2 billion CERs by 2012.
Sustainable development:
As understood in Clean Development Mechanism practice and ana lysis, this means Clean Development Mechanism projects' ability to provide benefits to the host country and project participants beyond GHG emission reductions. These may include direct and indirect benefits, such as: the provision of employment during project design and management; the transfer of technology, including knowledge, the development or improvement of social services; and the enhancement of environmental conditions, for example, by reducing local pollution or stabilizing soil erosion processes in the case of forestry projects. Benefits will vary across projects and the Designated National Authority should decide whether these are adequately addressed in the Project Design Document and to which extent they meet the government's sustainable development predefined criteria.
Executive Board: Supervises the functioning of the Clean Development Mechanism under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. It is the point of contact for Clean Development Mechanism project participants for project registration and the issuance of Certified Emissions Reductions.
Designated Operational Entity:
An independent auditor accredited by the Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board to validate project proposals or verify whether implemented projects have achieved planned GHG emission reductions. As of June 2011, there were 38 Designated Operational Entities authorized by the Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board.
and long term. This is to say that CDM projects do not evolve in a vacuum but are influenced by existing institutions and human capacities in the energy sector and beyond, including economic policies and incentives, regulations, private entrepreneurship levels and so on. Therefore, we broadly conceive institutions as formal and informal procedures, rules, organizations and behaviors that underlie CDM governance and, thus, influence the way in which projects are designed, developed, promoted and evaluated, as well as how such projects perform on the ground.
CDM scholarly literature has argued that the CDM constitutes an example of environmental policymaking that involves 'agency beyond the state' at different political levels and across various jurisdictions [7] . This perspective recognizes that both public and private actors operating outside the national government sphere, such as the CDM-EB, DOEs and private firms or NGOs in donor and host countries, can play a substantial role in CDM rule making and project implementation. Following Rindefjäll et al. and other recent contributors [7] [8] [9] , we endorse the view that CDM rules emanating from the international level get translated into the national and local levels in many different ways and that in such a process, the state, through its multiple institutional frameworks and organizations, can play a decisive role. Furthermore, and as highlighted above, the interpretation of international rules and their translation into local mitigation activities in host countries is mediated by the interactions between a variety of state and non-state actors operating within and across governance scales, including state administrations, domestic and international businesses, NGOs, consultants and third party auditors.
Since 2001 the CDM procedures were set in the Marrakech Accords (the rulebook of the KP), a number of new decisions have been periodically adopted to resolve procedural and implementation challenges. Among others, for example, the rules for the development of afforestation and reforestation projects were agreed in 2003, responding to a compromise between negotiating countries and a range of social actors who stood for or against the inclusion of forests under the mechanism [10] . Rules for the development of CDM Programme of Activities (PoAs) were approved in 2007 and revised in 2009, thereby paving the way for the development of projects that could bundle a number of microscale mitigation activities, mostly in the area of demand-side energy efficiency, renewable energy or the transport sector. PoAs aim to reduce transaction costs and maximise the volume of potential emission reductions. As of June 2011, there were eight PoAs registered under the CDM and another 84 were under validation [2] .
We have already noted that a variety of public and private actors are involved in the CDM. The project developer can be a public entity, such as the host country's national or regional government, as well as a profit or nonprofit organization based also in the host country or abroad. The project can involve both public and private investors, donors and carbon buyers, and funding can take the form of upfront loans or grants and ex-postcarbon finance. Developers must follow a Project Design Document (PDD) template and submit it to the host country's Designated National Authority (DNA) for endorsement according to the country's own SD criteria. Afterwards, the project should be validated by a DOE and subsequently submitted to the CDM-EB for approval and registration. During the validation process, the PDD is temporarily open to public comments that should be considered by the DOEs and the CDM-EB before project approval. Once a project is registered it can start operating and will require an additional process of verification by another DOE before issuing of any CERs. As noted earlier, governments from the KP's Annex B countries and private companies regulated by the EU-ETS or by other carbon markets are the most important buyers, and they can buy CERs directly to project managers or to intermediary organizations such as multilateral financial institutions, banks, traders or carbon consulting companies.
Various aspects of international CDM governance have been scrutinized from a range of different perspectives. Lövbrand and colleagues have argued that CDM rules lack sufficient input and output legitimacy [11] and, therefore, there is a clear tension between achieving cost-effective emission reductions and promoting inclusionary project design frameworks, as well as guaranteeing additional benefits beyond emission reductions. As we highlight below, however, this perspective has been somewhat challenged by those who have scrutinized CDM governance at national level, and found that a high level of output legitimacy may result from the fact that certain CDM projects are seen positively by society as a whole and by the fact that many of the actors involved in CDM governance share common interests [12, 13] . Some others have paid attention to existing backlogs, political interferences and inefficiencies in the process of CDM project approval and suggested reforms to strengthen it [14, 15] . New rules to improve CDM performance in terms 
Designated National Authority:
The body granted responsibility by a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) host country government to authorize and approve participation in CDM projects. Its main task is to assess potential CDM projects, to determine whether they will assist the host country in achieving its sustainable development goals and to provide a letter of approval to project participants in CDM projects.
Research Article Corbera & Jover of technology transfer and its outcomes beyond emission reductions have also been suggested [16] . Some of these suggestions have been taken up and addressed by regulators since 2009; for example, by streamlining project validation and CERs certification processes, developing a loan scheme to alleviate barriers in the development of projects hosted by the least developed countries and, more recently, starting up a policy dialogue to improve the mechanism post-2012 [17] .
Analyses of CDM governance in host countries have emerged in recent years. Okubo and Michaelowa [18] , for example, have shown that the development of CDM projects in least developed countries have been heavily constrained by lack of domestic capital and that donor efforts to support in-country capacities have been more successful when focused on establishing national authorities and supporting the overall process of projects' scoping, government's endorsement and subsequent validation. Four recent analyses of national CDM governance in China, India, Brazil and Chile reflect distinct responses to CDM development. Schroeder shows that the Chinese government has been very effective in using the CDM to foster its own mitigation priorities and in regulating CDM activities through taxes and levies [12] . The government has adopted 'traditional modes of hard steering more than new horizontal forms of soft steering' and has excluded from CDM national policymaking both civil society and private sector actors. Lack of participation by civil society organizations in the process of CDM project validation (e.g., through stakeholder comments) or simply in acting as watchdogs, are also common features of the Brazilian, Indian and Chilean cases. Specifically, Brazil's CDM development has been shaped, on the one hand, by the Brazilian DNA's committed approach to ensure that projects meet SD criteria and, on the other, by the broad-based support towards the development of renewable energy projects and bagasse cogeneration plants, which would have continued to be unattractive without additional CDM finance [13] . In contrast with the Chinese case and somewhat different from Brazil, CDM governance in India has been characterized by low levels of national government regulation, except in particular cases where international critique has emerged, such as in the development of large hydro projects. More recently, some Indian state governments are considering developing legislation for improving projects' benefit sharing [19] . Finally, in Chile, Rindefjäll and colleagues have shown that the country's DNA authority has adopted a 'market facilitation role' and that civil society actors have been mostly absent from providing comments to project developers and from shaping government's approach to market development [7] .
All this evidence contributes to highlight that CDM rules negotiated at the international level translate into very different outcomes at national and local levels, depending upon the level of national and state governments' involvement in regulating and overseeing CDM practice, the existing yet evolving configuration and responses of the business sector and civil society, and the opportunities for climate mitigation in distinct sectors of the economy. The combination of these factors contribute to explain why some mitigation sectors have become CDM-dominant in some countries but not in others, and what has been the role of public and private actors, as well as regulatory frameworks, in configuring CDM portfolios [6] .
Contested additionality
CDM projects are required to provide measurable, real and additional GHG benefits. Therefore, according to the Marrakech Accords, a CDM project must prove its additionality; that is, it must reduce anthropogenic GHG emissions below those that would have occurred in the most plausible alternative scenario to the implementation of the CDM project activity [20] . This alternative scenario, also known as the baseline scenario, may be the business-as-usual case (i.e., the continuation of current emission levels in the absence of the CDM activity), or it may be some other scenario involving a gradual lowering of emissions intensity. The baseline scenario should cover emissions from all gases, sectors and source categories listed in Annex A to the KP that occur within the project boundary, and should be developed using methodologies approved by the CDM-EB.
Demonstrating additionality has often been achieved using expert judgment and applying the additionality tool provided by the CDM-EB, which has been updated regularly since 2004, due to an increasingly diverse CDM pipeline that continuously incorporated new project types. Succinctly, the tool encompasses three different steps:
The identification of alternatives to the project; An investment ana lysis (i.e., to determine that the proposed project activity is either not the most econom ic a l ly /f i na ncia l ly at t r ac t ive or not economically/financially feasible without CDM revenues), and/or a barrier ana lysis (i.e., to demonstrate that the project would not have occurred as a result
Key term
Additionality: All Clean Development
Mechanism projects must demonstrate that they reduce anthropogenic GHG emissions below those that would have occurred in the absence of the project (i.e., above a baseline scenario) in order to become registered under the Kyoto Protocol. This in turn requires demonstrating that the project is a financially attractive activity that transcends common practice in both technological and policy terms.
of existing technological, regulatory and capacity conditions favoring other activities with higher emissions);
A common practice ana lysis (i.e., to demonstrate that such activity is not common in the area and is not mandated by regulation) [21, 22] .
The CDM-EB makes a critical differentiation between policy types in the determination of emission baseline scenarios. The latter should contemplate so-called E+ policies (i.e., national and/or sectoral policies or regulations that give comparative advantages to more emission-intensive technologies or fuels over less emissionintensive technologies or fuels) when these have been in place before 11 December 1997. When such policies have been implemented since the adoption of the KP, the baseline scenario should then refer to a hypothetical situation without the policies or regulations being in place. The determination of the emissions baseline scenario can ignore so-called E-policies (i.e., national and/or sectoral policies or regulations that give comparative advantages to less emission-intensive technologies over more emission-intensive technologies, such as public subsidies to promote the diffusion of renewable energy or to finance energy efficiency programs), when these have been adopted after 11 November 2001. Seemingly, it can also ignore existing policies that are systematically nonenforced, proven that noncompliance is widespread in the country [102] . These are relevant decisions in the context of this paper because, as we will show below, the additionality of the case studies selected could be otherwise challenged on the basis of existing regulatory frameworks that either enforce or promote the uptake and development of renewable energy technologies.
The CDM-EB has faced critiques on procedural failures and lack of political accountability and has had to respond to fraudulent reporting of additionality in registered projects [103] . In this regard, Michaelowa notes that 'between 2005 and 2007 large numbers of nonadditional projects were validated and registered' [22] . However, he also acknowledges that a growing expertise and staffing of the CDM-EB since 2007 has translated into an increasing share of annually rejected projects. Previous analyses of CDM projects registered before 2007 confirm Michaelowa's insights. Sutter and Parreño [23] analyze 16 projects and show that only five of them are truly additional. Their ana lysis is based on the assumption that only those projects with an internal rate of return that increased substantially with carbon revenues would be truly additional. Looking at a larger sample of 93 registered projects, Schneider [24] notes that 74% of these undertake a barrier ana lysis to demonstrate additionality, but nearly half of them (43%) fail to substantiate their claims. Furthermore, 38% of the DOEs validation reports endorse developers' views and do not conduct a careful scrutiny of the barrier ana lysis. This author also remarks that nearly 30% of those projects that also conduct an investment ana lysis (i.e., 33% of the total sample) do not 'provide the information required to allow the calculations to be reproduced and the assumptions to be verified' [24] . Other scholars arrive to similar conclusions looking at the development of CDM hydropower, wind and gas power plants initiatives in India and China [25, 26] .
The technical complexities involved in demonstrating additionality and the important share of projects that seem to be failing the test before registration underlie current proposals for improving existing tools, through the inclusion of more stringent criteria and procedures on projects benchmarking [22, 24] . However, failure to meet additionality requirements casts doubt on the actual usefulness of channeling carbon incentives towards projects and technologies that may have misrepresented emission baseline scenarios or may be financially attractive on their own. As Gillenwater puts it, 'if the concept of additionality and baselines are perceived by policy makers and much of the public as dubious and inherently problematic, then political support for emission offset policies, and potentially environmental markets more generally, could further dissipate' [2, 22] .
Contested SD benefits
The Marrakech Accords noted that while CDM projects' contribution to emission reductions had to be assessed by international auditors both prior to registration and to the issuance of any CERs, projects' contribution to SD had to be assessed by host country governments only [20] . This decision was made on the basis of host countries' fears that they would lose sovereignty in deciding which projects should or should not be endorsed prior to validation. Generally speaking, DNAs approach to the assessment of SD in PDDs differs across countries, but tends to involve the use of criteria checklists, which encompass indicators of: economic development, such as employment provision, benefit sharing and technology transfer; social development, such as improvement in energy access and capacity building; and environmental sustainability, such as reduction in emissions and other pollutants, and impacts on natural resources and ecosystems [1, 27] . Nonetheless, governments have only occasionally developed widespread public consultation processes before endorsing the project and periodical monitoring during implementation. Project developers have thus been mostly concerned with demonstrating projects' climate mitigation benefits and less so in showing their contribution to other socioeconomic goals [28] [29] [30] .
A number of studies have explored projects' SD performance through desk-based approaches, mostly based on PDDs and information provided by project developers. Following DNAs criteria checklists, such assessments have also been structured around 3D of SD (i.e., economic, social and environmental) differentiated in turn between direct and indirect benefits. The former are those directly derived from project activities and include, for example, enhanced air quality, improved health, reduced fossil-fuel expenditure and technology transfer, while indirect benefits can encompass poverty alleviation, improved waste management, job creation and useful byproducts, among others. Based on a sample of 744 PDDs of registered projects, Olsen and Fenhann [29] indicate that 'the five most common benefits of CDM projects are employment generation, economic growth, a better quality of air, access to energy and welfare improvements in terms of SD', although 'the SD profiles of project categories and project types… vary significantly' [29] . Another study examining 3296 PDDs, including projects at validation, highlights that only 36% of these could actually claim some sort of technology transfer [31] . An ana lysis of ten randomly chosen CDM registered projects indicates that there is no causal relationship between the nature of the projects and the provided outcomes, and that all of them bring modest direct benefits, but really fail to foster the local economy [1] .
Assessments of CDM projects' contribution to SD based on empirical research are somewhat scarcer, probably due to the relative short experience of most projects (i.e., <5 years) and also because access to these projects by independent researchers is probably difficult as a result of the likely impacts that public scrutiny may have on their credibility, particularly in front of carbon buyers. Wlokas [32] has explored the contribution to energy poverty alleviation of two projects installing solar water heaters in poor city neighborhoods in South Africa and concluded that 'the provision of a constant, cheap source of heated water contributed positively to the alleviation of energy poverty', albeit the strategies adopted by project developers significantly determined the extent to which other household benefits and expectations were realized. Gupta et al. apply a multicriteria analysis approach in five projects developed under the UNFCCC Activities Implemented Jointly pilot phase and show that poor project design explained projects' limited engagement with SD issues [33] .
Failure to seriously consider SD aspects in CDM projects has been related to the mechanism's market-based approach that selects against the most complex, less carbon rewarding and often more expensive projects, such as small-scale renewables involving local communities [34, 35] . Olsen [28] suggests that 'the real problem is that the CDM works perfectly as it produces the lowest cost emission reductions. Left out of the market, however, are the SD benefits. While rhetorically mandated in the KP, they are not monetized and therefore play a limited role in directing investments' [28] . The focus on lowrisk investments also explains the uneven geographical distribution of the projects that reveals a preference for highly industrialized and politically stable developing countries [36] .
A range of international initiatives have emerged in recent years to reinforce the sustainability component of CDM projects, including, for example, the Gold Standard initiative that increases the value of emission reductions through a certification standard, the Community Development Carbon Fund that targets small-scale projects located in poor communities and environments, and the Millennium Development Goals Carbon Facility that supports emission reduction projects with high MDG benefits. Unfortunately, the number of projects opting for certification standards, or being promoted through the above-mentioned instruments, still represents the exception rather than the common rule and there are not yet any studies comparing standardized and nonstandardized initiatives across project types [37] . Some scholars have thus suggested a range of structural changes to the CDM if in the future the mechanism must attain something more than climate mitigation benefits. Boyd and colleagues [1] advocate for the development of minimal international standards for SD benefits, an improved validation and registration system that prioritizes the most desirable projects, or even distort the market through positive and negative incentives on carbon crediting for more or less beneficial projects. Others advocate rent extraction to address equity and distributional issues and assist developing countries, in line with China's taxation approach to CDM projects, and particularly to large-scale, low-cost options [38] [39] [40] . More radically, academics and environmental activists argue that the CDM's lack of additionality and SD outcomes are sufficient reasons to suspend a mechanism that fails to be climatically neutral and sustains a right to pollute in Annex B countries [35] .
Methods & case studies
We chose Mexico as a case study to illustrate how governance processes influence the configuration of a country's CDM portfolio and to analyze the contribution to SD of representative projects. Mexico has the fourth largest CDM portfolio in the world after China, India and Brazil. As of June 2011, it had 127 registered projects and another 55 were at validation or in the process of registration [2] . The country has a high profile in national and international climate change policy. We interviewed 25 people at policy and project implementation levels in June of 2009. The former were chosen using a snowballing sampling technique, departing from key government contacts we had in advance of our fieldwork. At project level, we mostly targeted developers, DOEs and some key participants, but we could not involve a significant sample of farmers involved in the biodigester project and organizations lobbying against the wind farm due to limited field research time (Table 1) . Interviewees were asked questions such as, why CDM projects in Mexico have developed mostly in the agricultural and landfill sectors; which factors explain the rather limited number of CDM projects in the renewable energy sector; which role have the country's DNA and other state and non-state organizations played in CDM support and evaluation; which design and operational challenges projects face on the ground; and how project developers plan to provide benefits that are additional to GHG emission reductions.
The three selected projects represent the most relevant types of CDM activities in the country: methane avoidance, landfill gas and wind energy (Figure 1) . They had been selected on the basis of their longer time since registration in comparison to other existing projects (i.e., they had been registered and, therefore, theoretically operational for at least 2 years when fieldwork was conducted), and the availability of key project actors during our research visit. Their key characteristics are described in Table 2 . Drawing on Mexico's DNA criteria list and on other sources [42, 43] and using the information from the PDDs and the interviews with project managers, we scored projects against their contribution to SD, only for illustrative and comparative purposes. As shown in Supplementary Table 1, the SD criteria chosen aim to capture the contribution of projects to a variety of environmental, economic and social aspects. The limited number of projects analyzed does not allow us to derive robust results for the entire Mexican CDM portfolio, but permits capturing a set of processes and factors that may result determinant in CDM governance and projects' design and performance.
Results & discussion
CDM governance
This section highlights and discusses a set of institutional factors that explain the configuration of Mexico's CDM portfolio, and that have facilitated or constrained the design and implementation of methane avoidance, landfill gas and wind energy projects. As of June 2011, Mexico hosted 92 methane-avoidance, CDM-registered projects in animal farms, in addition to another ten projects at the validation stage. The registered initiatives represent 19% of the world's CDM projects in this sector and may deliver up to 49% of the country's CERs by 2012 [2] . These projects succinctly consist of building a biodigester (a capped container used to collect a mixture of water and animal excrements and that facilitates the anaerobic decomposition of the organic matter) and subsequently collecting the generated methane and burning it. Methane flaring results in carbon dioxide (i.e., a 21-times less-potent GHG), and some projects may further incorporate a generator to produce electricity. CDM initiatives of this kind often bundle several farms under a single project.
Over 70% of methane avoidance projects in Mexico have been developed by AgCert, an Irish-based company The high presence of these projects in Mexico has to do with the fact that the country has the eighth largest swine population in the world, with over 15 million pigs in 2008, of which 46% are raised in large-scale farms (i.e., between 100 and 100,000 animals). This made it a very attractive sector for the development of a large source of CDM credits [104] [R4,R12]. Additionally, since 2005, the Ministry of Agriculture (SAGARPA) has been co-financing the installation of biodigesters through the Ministry's Shared Risk Fund (FIRCO, for its Spanish acronym), which in turn eased the level of investment required for the installation of the biodigester in some sites chosen for CDM project development. Besides these favorable economic circumstances and financial conditions, the fact that a considerable number of Mexican swine farms belong to the same company favored site-bundling in project design, thereby lowering transaction costs while still benefiting from the application of a small-scale CDM methodology. Lastly, proving additionality was not difficult because, by the time most of these projects were registered (i.e., between 2005 and 2007), there were not any federal or state regulations requiring the installation of biodigesters in animal farms [44] . However, as we show below, operational problems with the technology and challenges in project management resulted in reduced expectations over the amount of generated CERs [44] .
Landfill gas capture is the second most prominent CDM activity in Mexico. As of June 2011, there were 16 registered projects and another ten were at the validation stage or seeking registration [2] . These projects essentially consist of developing a system of tubes that can collect methane and other GHG emissions generated in a controlled landfill and flare them for electricity production. This contrasts with methane avoidance projects of which the great majority did not contemplate producing electricity to reduce capital costs. Project actors include national or international technology providers and landfill managers, carbon consulting companies, municipal governments as landfill owners, and Annex B governments as the most common CER buyers. Projects additionality was guaranteed by the fact that most landfills in Mexico lack the technology for biogas collection and flaring, and the existing federal and state-based laws and norms regulating landfill management, including biogas control, are often not enforced [45] . Mexico has a great potential to expand renewable energy sources, but 81% of the country's generated electricity still comes from burning fossil fuels, while only 0.1% is produced through wind farms [46] . Some analysts have argued that the underperformance of renewable energy in Mexico has to do with the culture of and laws directing the state-run companies that control the country's power generation and transmission [47] . The National Electricity Commission (CFE) controls up to 80% of the country's electricity generation and distribution and it is bounded to the provisions of the 1975 (amended in 1993) federal Electricity Public Service Law (LSPEE, for its Spanish acronym), which states that the CFE must guarantee the supply of electricity at the lowest possible cost. The remaining 20% is currently provided by the other state-run company Luz y Fuerza del Centro (1.5%) and by Independent Power Producers (IPPs) (18.5%) [48] . The LSPEE establishes five different modalities for electricity production by non-state actors and defines the conditions for transferring electricity into the grid and for selling it to the CFE; LSPEE Articles 3 and 36. Nonetheless, the first wind energy project ever designed in Mexico (i.e., La Venta I) was not authorized until 1998 and there were no further developments until La Venta II (the CDM project we discuss below) became operational in 2006. The CFE has developed both projects to produce electricity for the national grid.
As of June 2011, there were nine wind energy CDM registered projects in Mexico and another 15 were at validation stage or seeking registration [2] . All projects except La Venta II have been developed by IPPs under the so-called self-supply scheme that entails an agreement between project investors and the IPP, through which the former purchases at least one share of the project company and commits to buy the produced electricity at a competitive price while the CFE accepts to buy, at least in principle, any remaining production at discounted prices; that is, below its own production costs (LSPEE Article 36). The IPPs involved include foreign companies such as Gamesa and Iberdrola (three projects), and Mexican energy companies such as Eurus, Eoliatec, Fuerza Eólica and Eléctrica del Valle de Mexico. According to Lokey [47] and insights from our interviews [R24,R28], these companies faced numerous hurdles prior to PDDs design. It was difficult for them to obtain a lease for the land where the project had to develop, as well as completing an agreement with investors regarding the share-holding agreement. It was also difficult to settle the price for electricity transmission with the CFE. In contrast, however, proving the additionality of wind IPP projects was not difficult because they could demonstrate either that the CFE was not planning these or other renewable developments aimed at providing electricity, such as large-scale biomass and thermo-solar, when being developed, or that incentives for renewables were only recently established and were not in place before 2001. Wind IPP projects could also prove that future CERs would increase the project's Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and would therefore buffer the project financial returns against the fact that the CFE was not obliged to purchase all the electricity generated.
Most notably, however, in 2008 Mexico passed new legislation to promote the deployment of renewable energy; that is, the so-called Law for the Promotion of Renewable Energy and the Financing of the Energy Transition (latest amendment in June 2011; LAERFTE, for its Spanish acronym) and its subsequent rules approved in 2009, complemented by the Special Programme for the Promotion of Renewable Energy (PEAER, for its Spanish acronym) [105, 106] . This legislative package recognizes for the first time that the State is also responsible for expanding renewable energy technologies, defines renewable energy capacity goals to be achieved up to 2012 and establishes a public fund for supporting the development of the PEAER. The new legislation is already contributing to increase the number of wind farms in Mexico from 12 operational ones in 2010, including the CDM registered initiatives, to potentially more than 30 by 2014, thereby expanding installed capacity from the current 1160 MW to more than 9000 MW [107] . As noted earlier, at least 15 of these new wind farms are currently seeking CDM approval. These regulatory developments and their accompanying public and international funds may substantially change the economics of renewable energy projects, but they are unlikely to put into question wind projects' financial and regulatory additionality if the current framing of additionality and the determination of baseline scenarios do not change (see reference to E-policies in the previous section).
Project ana lysis
The Mexican Committee for the Reduction and Capture of GHG Emissions (COMEGEI) is a working group of the Intersecretarial Climate Change Commission that has been acting as Mexico's DNA since 2002. In theory, its main tasks consist of identifying CDM investment opportunities and facilitating, promoting and approving CDM projects. In practice, however, the DNA has been limited to issuing projects' approval letters due to lack of staff and financial resources. The DNA has developed a list of SD assessment criteria but these are neither systematically applied across all projects nor involve follow-up during implementation. In this regard, one of our interviewees asserted that evaluating the progress of CDM projects has been almost as impossible as it has been to ensure that SD actually materialize when projects are implemented [R2]. Furthermore, some project developers acknowledged that seeking the government's approval has never been a major project development barrier [R12,R15]. In addition to the DNA, the government, in partnership with a national financial institution, established the Mexican Carbon Fund (FOMECAR, for its Spanish acronym) in 2007 in order to provide technical and financial support to private developers in the design of CDM projects. As of June 2011, it has provided support to five CDM registered projects focused on methane avoidance, landfill gas, energy efficiency and wind energy activities.
The methane avoidance project Porcina La Bellota II [49] captures and burns methane gas from open-air swine manure lagoons in three farms and it does not incorporate the electricity production component. Taking into account the fact that more than 110 million hectares of Mexican national territory are dedicated to livestock farming and that the number of farms has increased 28% over the last 10 years [50] , AgCert participated in installing biodigesters in over 300 farms across the country, bundling some in single CDM projects and selling the correspondent credits as a good business opportunity; the company also manages another 27 similar CDM projects in Brazil. The company committed to installing the biodigester, training farmers for its operation and maintenance, monitoring its functioning and granting 10% of future carbon revenues to the farm owner, a model that was replicated in the other managed CDM projects [108] .
Insights from fieldwork interviews, however, confirmed that this approach was far from successful. The project investigated, and many others in the company's portfolio, were unlikely to deliver the level of emission reductions promised in the PDD, which impaired negatively on the company's financial performance and led it to look for protection from its main creditor AES in 2008 [R12,R13]. The selected project had only achieved 38% of the emission reductions promised during the first year of operation due to changes in market incentives and technology-related problems. Farm owners sold part of their livestock to take advantage of favorable prices and in doing so they reduced the amount of manure produced. Additionally, project developers were unable to control the dose of antibiotics that farmers gave to the animals, which in turned harmed the bacteria living in the biodigesters and affected biogas generation. The latter was further undermined by difficulties associated with controlling the optimal conditions of pH in the manure and the temperature in the biodigester. Furthermore, there were unforeseen costs of new and improved flaring stacks required by the CDM-EB. Overall, the project did not create any additional employment and had a very limited impact on farmers' knowledge regarding the use of biodigesters, but partly contributed to reducing farmers' exposure to methane and other noxious gases.
The landfill gas project analyzed is located in the municipality of Ecatepec in the state of Mexico [51] . EcoMethane developed the project through a joint venture participated by Biogas Technology Ltd and the ENERG Group in charge of financing, constructing and operating landfill gas projects worldwide, and by EcoSecurities in charge of pursuing CDM registration and the future sale of CERs to international investors, particularly to the UK government. The municipal government owns the landfill and managed it until 2005, when it ceded its operationalization to Asiamex, a private Mexican company. However, in 2008, the municipality assumed again the control of the landfill because the company failed to manage waste adequately. The benefit sharing arrangement between the involved parties remains undisclosed.
According to the PDD, the project was supposed to start in 2006 but in June 2009 only 30% of the total landfill area had been sealed and prepared for the installation of the required GHG capture and flaring equipment. This was due to the existing conflict between the municipal government and the landfill manager and due to lack of public finance. With the project at a standstill in 2009, its impact on reduced GHG and other pollutants emissions was positive but much less than expected, and the municipal government had not yet decided what to do with the revenues from future CERs. It was considering dedicating them to uplifting the poor neighboring settlement of Prados San Juan, which counted with 85 families living in dreadful health conditions [R16] . The project generated a few temporal jobs in its first 2 years but, as of today, both CERs and the maintenance or extension of employment levels remain hypothetical.
Finally, the wind farm of La Venta II was the first ever large-scale wind power project developed in Mexico, and it is located in the municipality of Juchitán de Zaragoza, in the state of Oaxaca [52] . As noted earlier, the project was developed by the CFE and consists of 98 0.85 MW turbine generators that supply electricity to the national grid. The project was made possible through a World Bank grant that was provided in exchange for a 30% share in future carbon revenues. The CFE will own the remaining 70%, which will in turn be sold to the Spanish government -through the World Bank -or to any other interested party. La Venta II delivered 79.5% of the emission reductions estimated during its first 2 years of operation and created 17 permanent jobs. Nonetheless, as documented for similar developments elsewhere in the world [53, 54] , the establishment of the wind farm resulted in considerable local conflict. Insights from fieldwork [R27,R28,R29] and existing literature [109] note that the CFE did not consult local communities regarding the location of the wind farm and that the subsequent economic compensations per hectare were unevenly spread across communities and individuals. Furthermore, the police and public authorities threatened those who actively opposed the project.
Supplementary Table 1 summarizes projects' contribution to climate mitigation and other SD benefits. Both methane-related projects have great potential to reduce GHG and other pollutants concentrations, as well as to reduce soil and water contamination, but problems in project design and implementation have hampered the full realization of such benefits. In this regard, AgCert failed to transfer the necessary knowledge for an effective use of the technology to the farmers, who were in turn probably unaware of the repercussions of an inefficient performance of the biodigester over the provision of future CERs. The unfulfilled potential of the Ecatepec project has nothing to do with technology transfer, but with a failed public-private partnership and unexpected challenges derived from previously existing conflicts over landfill management. The wind project has resulted in the same environmental impacts as other initiatives of this kind, which mostly include landscape visual impacts and temporal siltation of adjacent river flows. From a socioeconomic perspective, it is worth noting that methane projects, if designed and managed more effectively, have a great potential to increase health conditions in surrounding populations. The wind project provides higher employment levels overall, but the landfill project is more beneficial relative to CERs provision.
Complex governance & uneven outcomes
The results highlighted above contribute to ongoing debates about the governance, additionality and SD aspects of the CDM. As in any other CDM recipient country, one should differentiate between the governance processes and factors that determine the configuration of the CDM at international level, of the country's CDM portfolio and of projects' outcomes on the ground. Our ana lysis shows that current practice in the determination of baseline scenarios and additionality has facilitated the development of sectoral projects in Mexico that already count with sectoral policies that promote or make compulsory their implementation, such as wind energy and landfill gas capture activities, respectively. CDM investment has contributed to improved financial rates of return in wind energy developments and reduce the risks related to the regulator's commitment regarding electricity purchases and prices. Returns on CER sales have also been seen as an opportunity to reduce design and transaction costs in landfill gas and biodigesters' activities.
Our findings also demonstrate how national economic characteristics contribute to shape a country's CDM profile. In Mexico, the dominance of methane avoidance projects in the CDM portfolio is strongly related to the existence of a very large animal farm sector with an untapped mitigation potential, as well as the presence of hundreds of landfills in poor management conditions that require upgrading. Furthermore, the country's portfolio is also explained by the existence of key international and national entrepreneurs who have been able to identify such mitigation opportunities, as highlighted elsewhere [7, 13, 19] . CDM activities have been further facilitated by public organizations, such as the country's DNA, which has adopted a flexible approach to projects' SD assessment, and municipal governments willing to engage in partnerships for improved landfill management. Other government-led institutions such as FIRCO and FOMECAR have also supported project developers by providing technical and financial support. The combination of the above mentioned regulatory frameworks that ease the demonstration of projects' additionality and the existence of state-based organizations supporting the CDM suggest that the mechanism outcomes ultimately rely on a combination of multiple agencies that translate into contextually situated projects.
Precisely, our insights from the three case studies chosen demonstrate that the realization of project objectives depends upon design approaches and unexpected events during implementation. In the methane avoidance projects, for example, both AgCert and farm owners will not obtain the expected level of carbon revenues because the technology was not built to adjust to local farms circumstances [109] and the provided training was insufficient. The landfill case, in contrast, represents an example of unforeseen management problems that immediately translate into ineffective public-private partnerships. Here, a conflict between the landfill manager and the municipal government put the project in a standstill for almost 3 years and the municipality only very slowly agreed new terms of collaboration with the project developer. This example reinforces the idea that, in the context of CDM governance, the state is not a uniform constituency but a compendium of administrative organizations that respond differently to the mechanism depending on their responsibilities in rule making and their role in activities' implementation. The wind farm project provides an example of how the technology itself, rather than its CDM dimension, results in landscape changes that in turn generate social conflict. Our three examples also reveal a clash between 'governance from above' and 'governance from below' practices [6] ; that is, a conflict between what participants think they should do in response to a particular situation and what project developers or governments think the response should be. For example, when farmers responded to favorable price incentives and sold animals in response, they challenged the effective functioning of the biodigester against the recommendation of project developers. When Ecatepec's municipal government decided to cancel the contract with the landfill operator, it was aware that such a decision was going to affect the timeline of the CDM project and, therefore, its short-term ability to issue CERs.
In the early years of CDM development, some Mexican organizations expressed concerns over the development of projects in the country, being mostly wary about the fact that the mechanism would at best offset emissions from developed countries and would not steer substantial mitigation in Annex I countries [55] . These concerns, however, have not translated over time into a socially and politically articulated response that could influence government procedures; for example, on SD projects' assessment. This echoes findings from other countries where civil society organizations have not played a very significant role either in lobbying against the CDM or in ensuring that project outcomes are environmentally and socially sound [9] . At the international level, networks such as the Climate Action Network or CDM-Watch have consolidated over time and worked towards scrutinizing projects, criticizing bad ones and lobbying against certain decisions under discussion at the CDM-EB level. CDM-Watch has also developed regional and national workshops to inform civil society from developing countries about the CDM and its potential risks and failures.
It is worth noting to conclude that the active involvement of civil society at the international level and the continuous improvement of the additionality tool by the CDM-EB, as well as the currently open public dialogue to improve the mechanism, are indicative of how international governance processes are steered towards, on the one hand, assessing consistently the emission reduction objectives set by projects and, on the other, guaranteeing that most of the involved international parties reach a consensus on the best procedures for project design and implementation in host countries [56, 57] . In this regard, one can probably assert that host country national governments have generally lacked the will or the resources to open up spaces for social debate around CDM issues, which could facilitate discussions about which activities should be promoted -if any -and about how to better guarantee cost-effective, participatory and SD-oriented project design and implementation approaches, if this is possible at all. Further regulation in this direction would entail at least the improvement of existing SD criteria and the development of project monitoring protocols, while mandating developers to pay careful attention to both national and local governance processes [58] , such as those highlighted in this paper (e.g., behavioral aspects of technology adoption processes, existing formal and informal regulatory frameworks, and contestation over particular technologies and management practices).
Conclusion
This paper has discussed Mexico's CDM governance processes and analyzed the SD outcomes of three existing projects, based on data gathered through interviews with key policymakers, project developers and project participants. It has highlighted a number of national institutional factors that explain the dominance of some activities over others in the country's CDM portfolio and that facilitate projects' design and implementation of such activities. First, we have noted that projects' additionality has been demonstrated on the basis of missing legal provisions for the uptake and deployment of particular technologies (e.g., biodigesters and wind energy) and of ineffective law enforcement (e.g., landfill gas capture). Second, we have highlighted the key role of private market players, government organizations (i.e., DNA) and public funding schemes (e.g., FIRCO, FOMECAR) in supporting project design and easing project investment requirements. Our ana lysis of three projects has also shown that a set of other processes have contributed to limit their contribution to climate mitigation and SD, including the existence of conflicting public-private partnerships, the lack of participatory project design approaches, and ineffective technology and knowledge transfer mechanisms. Overall, these insights are in line with the views of those who suggest that, in order to understand if the CDM and other policy and market endeavors for clean development result in significant environmental and social benefits, attention must be paid to the mechanisms and processes at work in host countries and the interactions and uneven power relations between all actors that hold direct, indirect and sometimes opposing interests in CDM market development [7] [8] [9] . The ana lysis of three projects, albeit not representative of Mexico's total portfolio, also suggests that CDM SD benefits can be jeopardized by the interplay of these processes and actors, thus cautioning against the validity of both favorable and unfavorable claims regarding the CDM's actual role in climate mitigation and socioeconomic development at local, national and global scales.
Future perspective
As we write, the 17th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC is in preparation. Even since the Copenhagen fiasco in late 2009, there are still people who hope for a globally binding GHG emission reduction agreement that can contribute to avoiding dangerous climate change, a scenario that is already very likely if emission trends do not radically shift. Regardless of whether such an agreement is reached, the EU has committed itself to reduce emissions by 20% in 2020 and therefore plans to continue relying on the ETS and the CDM. Nonetheless, without a global agreement and/or the development and consolidation of other regulated carbon markets, the number of projects entering the CDM pipeline and the validation stage is unlikely to increase, except for the case of PoAs that will evolve in the context of host countries' national mitigation actions and strategies. Consequently, potential CERs supply will continue to be higher than demand, which may imply that host country governments and project managers will continue to support the provision of price-competitive CERs, probably at the expense of additional SD outcomes. PoAs may substitute HFCs and nitrous oxide projects as the new low-hanging CDM fruit, providing large volumes of cheap credits without accountable and monitored benefits beyond emission reductions.
In this context, putting in place the procedural reforms highlighted in the discussion becomes critical. A more stringent regulation of CDM procedures at national and project levels, promoted by the UNFCCC and guaranteed through third party involvement, may result in more careful policy and project designs and can potentially transform the way in which government and project developers' have approached SD in the CDM to date (i.e., a criteria, checklist assessment exercise). New CDM regulations can promote a deeper understanding of regional and local environmental, economic, social and cultural processes in order to develop inclusionary projects at both design and implementation levels. In this sense, governments of both buyer and host countries can have a critical role to play as facilitators of funding streams for capacity building and knowledge transfer, for example. Unfortunately, however, it may be the case that, as it happened during the recent financial crisis, those who advocate for maintaining the status quo persuade negotiators to discard the adoption of more regulatory burdens. Furthermore, as highlighted in some of the reviewed literature for this paper, some, and probably too many, host country governments may favor a 'soft' regulatory approach in order to capture foreign direct investment and facilitate projects' development regardless of their local development implications. In this case, critical academics and social activists
Executive summary Clean Development Mechanism governance & performance issues
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has emerged as a key instrument for climate change mitigation aligning the interests of Annex I and non-Annex I parties, with more than 3000 projects registered as of June 2011. CDM governance is influenced by existing institutions and human capacities in the energy sector and beyond, including economic policies and incentives, regulations and private entrepreneurship.
CDM international rules get translated into the national and local levels in many different ways, and in such process the state, through its multiple institutional frameworks and organizations, can play a decisive role together with a variety of non-state actors, including domestic and international businesses, NGOs, consultants and third party auditors.
CDM governance in Mexico
The CDM market in Mexico is dominated by methane avoidance activities in animal farms and landfills, as well as by wind energy projects, and a range of private actors have benefited from the large untapped mitigation potential in these sectors and from existing, as well as nonenforced, regulatory frameworks that contributed to justify projects' additionality.
The government has developed public financial institutions to support CDM project development and the country's Designated National Authority has had a 'soft' approach towards the regulation and overseeing of the country's projects.
The participation of civil society in shaping the design of Mexico's Designated National Authority criteria or engaging with projects' assessment before government endorsement and during implementation has been limited.
CDM projects' performance
The ana lysis of three case studies representative of the country's CDM portfolio suggests that the realization of climate mitigation and sustainable development objectives depend upon design approaches and unexpected events during implementation.
Conflicting public-private partnerships, the lack of participatory project design approaches and ineffective technology and knowledge transfer mechanisms can hamper project development.
Increased international regulation, in order to increase public participation in national CDM governance and to guarantee the provision of multiple benefits at project level, is desirable.
